We consider secure sketch construction in an asymmet ric setting, that is, multiple samples are acquired during enrollment, but only a single sample is obtained during ver ification. Known protection methods apply secure sketch constructions on the average of the samples, while publish ing the auxiliary information extracted from the set of sam ples, such as variances or weights of the features, in clear.
Introduction
Protection techniques for biometric templates, such as fuzzy commitment [6] , fuzzy vault [5] , and secure sketch [3] , publish small pieces of data to aid reconstruc tion of the biometric secrets under inevitable noises. One important goal of these techniques aims to minimize the in formation loss of the published data, which are also known as secure sketches. Essentially, during enrollment, after the biometric data X is obtained, its sketch S is constructed, typically based on some error-correcting code. From anoth er X' obtained during verification, if X and X' are suffi ciently close, the original X can be reconstructed from X' and S. With the sketch released as public data and available during verification, the exact X can be reconstructed when ever a close enough X' is presented. Thus, X can be used as a consistent secret in cryptographic operations. Since the 978-1-4577-1359-0/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE sketch is to be revealed, it must not leak important infor mation on X and the identity of the enrollee. Known con structions of secure sketches, such as for fingerprints [1, 2] or faces [13] , generally handle biometric data that are mod eled as a set of feature points (either ordered or unordered) under two types of noises. The first type perturbs each bio metric feature point by a small amount; and the second type adds and removes some feature points. The differences un der the first type of noise can be measured using Euclidean distance, whereas the second type can be measured using set difference.
The constructions of sketches are typically applied in a symmetric setting, that is, only one sample is acquired dur ing both enrollment and verification. To improve the perfor mance in terms of relative operating characteristic (ROC), many applications [4, ] 2, 7] adopt an asymmetric setting. During enrollment phase, multiple samples are obtained, whereby an average sample and auxiliary information such as variances or weights of features are derived. During veri fication, only one sample is acquired. The derived auxiliary information can be helpful in improving ROC. For example, it could indicate that a particular feature point is relatively inconsistent and should not be considered, and thus reduc ing the false reject rate. Note that the auxiliary informa tion is identity-dependent in the sense that different identity would have different auxiliary information. Li et al. [10] ob served that by using the auxiliary information in the asym metric setting, the "key strength" could be enhanced due to the improvement of ROC, but there could be higher leakage on privacy.
Current known works, for example, the schemes given by Li et al. [10] and by Kelkboom [7] , store the auxiliary information in clear. Li et al. [10] employ a scheme that carefully groups the feature points to minimize the differ ences of variance among the groups. The derived grouping is treated as auxiliary information and is published in clear. The scheme proposed by Kelkboom et al. [7] computes the means and variances of the features from the multiple enrolled face images, and selects the k features with least vari ances. The selection indices are also published in clear. The revealed auxiliary information could potentially leak impor tant identity information as an adversary could distinguish whether a few sketches are of from the same identity by comparing the auxiliary information. Such leakage is simi lar to the sketch distinguishability in the typical sYlmnetric setting [ 11] . Therefore, it is desired to have a sketch con struction that can protect the auxiliary information as well.
In this paper, we construct two schemes where the auxil iary information is protected by "mixing" it into the sketch. We extend the notation of entropy loss [3] and give a formu lation on information loss for secure sketch under aSYlmnet ric setting (Section 2.2). We give two sketch constructions for asymmetric setting under the two types of noise. The first construction handles the Euclidean noise with auxiliary information modeled by level of the noise (Section 3). The second construction handles set difference with a weight vector indicating the consistency of the biometric features (Section 4).
We analyze the proposed schemes under two security no tions, namely, the average min-entropy loss of the identi ty information, and the linkages of sketches. Our analy sis shows that, and yet our schemes have similar bound on information loss compared to the straightforward methods, they offer better privacy protection (Section 3.2, Section 4.2). A secure sketch scheme is a tuple (M, D, Ene, Dee), where Ene: M ---+ {O, l}* is an en coder and Dec: M x {O, I} * ---+ M is a decoder such that for all (X, X') E D, Dee(X', Ene(X)) = X. The output S = Ene(X) of the encoder, is called the sketch of X.
Since the exact X can be reconstructed with a close enough X', X can be used as a consistent secret in known cryptographic techniques, for example, a key in a encryp tion scheme.
Asymmetric Sketch
We now extend the definition of secure sketch to the asymmetric setting. Let B and X be the information ob tained during registration and verification respectively, and let V be the set of all B's, and M be the set of all X's.
Note that in the asymmetric setting, V is not the same as M. Let C c V x M be a relation where, (B, X) E C if the biometric data X obtained during verification should be considered to be from the same enrollee who provides B. We define asymmetric secure sketch as follow:
Asymmetric secure sketch.
An asymmetric secure sketch scheme is a tuple (M, V, C, P, Ene, Dec), where Ene : V ---+ {O, l}* is an encoder and Dec : M x {O, l}* ---+ M is a decoder such that for all (B,X) E C, Dee(X, Ene(B)) = P(B), where P is a projection from V to M.
Similarly, P(B) can be used as a consistent secret as it can be reconstructed exactly from S and X if B and X are provided by the same person.
Entropy Loss from Sketches
The security of a sketch scheme relies on how much in formation of the biometric data is leaked from the sketch. We follow Dodis et al. [3] notion which quantifies the lost in formation based on average min-entropy. It can be shown [3] that:
where R is the invested randomness in sketch construction that can be recovered from X and the sketch S. This is a useful inequality in bounding the (worst case) entropy loss w.r.t any distribution on X.
In the asymmetric setting, we care about the leakage on identity dependent information, and thus consider B H=(B) -H=(B IS) as the security measurement. By the same argument in (1), we can give a similar bound on the entropy loss in asymmetric setting:
Privacy of Schemes
The quantity of remaining entropy is not the only se curity concern. Even if the remaining entropy is large, important information on identity might have been leaked by a sketch. There are also other concerns, for example, cross matching [8] and correlation attack [9] . Simoens et al.[] 1] give a security model on the sketch distinguishabil ity. They examine the probability that an attacker can de termine whether two documents were encrypted using the same biometric. We give a similar model in the asymmetric setting: the adversary has two sketches and he wants to de termine whether they belong to the same identity. Formally, for a sketch scheme, consider the following game between the challenger C and an attacker A: The random noise model in second step of the above game is determined by the enrollment process, which mod els the noise between two enrollments of the same identity. The value IPr [ a' = a] -� I reflects effectiveness of the at tacker in distinguishing the identity given two sketches. In Section 3, we will show that compared to the straightfor ward scheme, our construction is able to hide the auxiliary information while the entropy loss remain unchanged. Note that when a = 1, there is a chance that the randomly select ed B1 is close to Bo. Such probability corresponds to the false accept rate and should be small.
3.
Asymmetric Sketch under Euclidean
Distance
In this section, we give a construction for Euclidean dis tance. Let us illustrate our idea with a simple case where a biometric sample is represented as an integer in [ 0, n). Given B = (b, v) , the encoder Enc 2 constructs the sketch S in the following steps:
1. Let G be a set of two integers {b -v, b + v}. 4. Let k be the number of elements in G, sorts G in as cending order and let the sorted list be (gl, ... ,gk), note that gl is negative and gk > n.
5. Let Ri = gH1 -gi for i in [I, k), returns the sequence (gl, R1, R 2 , · .. , Rk -1) as the sketch S.
Intuitively, the R;'s are the lengths of the intervals as shown in Figure l(b) . The Dec 2 algorithm on X and S, reconstructs the set G = (gl, g 2 , ... , gk), and finds the first i such that gi > X (note that i > 1 since gl < 0), and returns (gi -l + gi)/2. The projection P(B) outputs b as in scheme SSl.
The correctness (i.e. Dec(X, Enc(B)) = P(B)) of the scheme can be easily verified: if X and B are from the same identity, then we have b -v < X < b + v, and thus gi = b + v, gi -1 = b -v and (gi -1 + gi) /2 = b. This leads to Dec(X, S) = P(B) as required.
Analysis of Entropy Loss
The following analysis gives a bound on the entropy loss (Section 2.3) and gives the comparison on privacy (Section 2.4) of scheme SSl and SS 2 . Note that such bound holds for any distribution on X. (2), the entropy loss is at most log 2q + (k -1) log q -(k -2) log q = 1 + 2 log q. D For the scheme S Sl, since the number of bits required to describe the sketch is Ivl + lei, and there is no randomness involved, the entropy loss is bounded by Ivl + Ib mod 2vl.
Note that v is in range [1, q] , Hoo (v) :s; log q, and Hoo (c) = Hoo (b mod 2v -1) :s; log 2q, thus, the entropy loss of scheme SSl is bounded by 1 + 2 log q.
Analysis of Sketch Distinguishability
While the entropy loss of schemes SSl and SS2 are bounded by a same value, scheme SSl reveals the auxiliary information in clear, whereas scheme SS2 protects the aux iliary information by "mixing" it with the biometric secret and giving different sketches for different enrollments. In this section we will analyze the impact of such difference.
For the discussion to be meaningful, let us assume that the auxiliary infonnation is identity dependent and there are two thresholds t and E such that for two biometric data B = (b, v) and B' = (b', v') obtained from the same identity, we will have Pr[lv -v'l ?: t] < E, and for two biometric
For scheme SSl, let C1 and Al be the challenger and attacker described in Section 2.4, let Bo = (bo, vo), B1 = (b1, vI) be the two sketches output by C1. There is an effec tive algorithm Al in guessing a': it outputs 0 if and only if Ivo -vII < t. In this case, the probability Pr[a' = a I a = 0] ?: 1 -E and Pr[a' = a I a = 1] ?: 1 -2 t ; 1 -E.
For scheme SS2, one strategy of A2 is to count the num ber of "similar intervals": two overlapping intervals are similar if the ratio between the length of their intersection and the length of their union is greater than the threshold t !q. A2 outputs 0 if the number of "similar intervals" be tween Ene(Bo) and Ene(BI) is larger than a threshold it learnt, and output 1 otherwise.
The intuition of the above strategy is that, when a = 0, the count is expected to be larger. However, when n is large and q is small, the domain [0, n) is divided into many inter vals and this will reduce the effectiveness of the strategy of A2. Thus, the attack will depends not only on the parameter q, t but also on n. Figure 2 shows how the parameters will affect the priva cy protection. We implement the scheme SS2 and for different values of nand q with t = 1 and E = 0.001, we ran domly generated 106 biometrics Bo, construct Ene(Bo), Ene(B1) with different randomness then count the number of similar intervals, where B1 is a noisy version of Bo. The histogram of the counts is shown by the red dotted line in the figure. We then randomly generated 106 pairs of Bo, B1, construct Ene(Bo) and Ene(BI) and count the num ber of similar intervals, where Bo and B1 are two different biometric templates. The histogram of the counts is shown by the blue solid line in the figure. Let us consider Figure 2 (c) where n = 1000 and q = 5 as an example. When given two sketches with k "similar intervals", A2 looks at the probability distribution approxi mated by Figure 2(c) . He checks whether the the red dotted line (which approximates the probability that two sketch es are from the same identity) is higher than the blue solid line, and then guess the b' which gives the maximum like lihood. When n = 1000 and q = 5, A2 should guess b' = 0 when k > 21 and the probability of A2 wins the game is less than 0.55. In contrast, under the same parame ters, the adversary Al for the straightforward Scheme SSl is able to distinguish two sketches with a probability at least (1 + 1 -2 t ; 1 ) /2 = 0.9. Figure 2 also shows that when n gets larger and q gets smaller, the success probability of A2 approaches �.
Asymmetric Sketch for Set Difference
In this section, we give an extension of fuzzy vault scheme by luels and Sudan [5] to handle the set difference, where a biometric sample can be represented as a set of elements in a space Zp. Under asymmetric setting, multi ple sets are enrolled and two sets can be extracted: a set X = {XO, Xl, ... , Xm -l} where Xi E Zp of the elements appeared, and a set V denoting the importance, derived by the consistency, of each element.
Let us first describe the fuzzy vault scheme[5]:
1. Randomly picks a polynomial F of degree m -2t -1 in field Zp. Zp -{F(i)} to be Yi.
Given a X', the reconstruction process attempts to find the polynomial F using the points {(i, Yi)li E X'}, and then reconstructs X. When there is at least m -t common points in X and X', the polynomial F can be reconstructed.
Let us call this Scheme SS3.
The Asymmetric Setting
One possible auxiliary information set difference is the importance and consistancy of the elements in the set. Let us consider the case where during enrollment, B = (X, V) is extracted from the multiple samples, where X = {XO, Xl, ... , Xm -l} is a vector of m elements with Xi E Zp, and V = {(xo, VO) , (Xl, VI ) ' ... ' (Xm -l, Vm -l)} is the corresponding weights of the elements, with each Vi E Zq.
During verification, X' = {x�, x�, ... , X k-l} is obtained from the single sample of the biometrics. X' and B are in the close relation C if the sum of the weights of the com mon elements is larger than a threshold t, i.e. 2:: v E w V > t where W = {vl3x, (x, v) E V and X E (X n X')}.
Scheme SS3 can be considered as a special case where m = k and all the v/s are 1.
The main idea of our construction is to extend the above scheme by associating the more important elements to more points to the polynomial F so that they will contribute more roots in verification. Let H(x, y) = (x + qy) be a function on Zq x Zp --+ Zpq, and the sketch construction is as follow:
1. Randomly picks a polynomial F of degree 9 -2t' -1 in field Zpq, where 9 = 2:: v E V (V) and t' = (g -t).
2. Starts with a set Y = X and an empty set S. Inserts (H(j, Xi), F(H(j, Xi))) to S for H(j, Xi) E Ci and inserts (H(j, Xi), Yj,xJ to S for H(j, Xi) E (Ci -CD where Yj,x.; is randomly chosen from Zp -{F(H(j, Xi))}. Xi) )}.
5. Output S.
During verification, given a X' = {X�, X� , ... , x k-l} '
Dec first computes the set S' of {H(j, x;) Ix; E X', j E [0, q -1], and then finds the polynomial F of degree 9 -2t' -1 with points in the set. If such F is found, the original X can be reconstructed. The projection P(B) maps B = (X, V) to X. Let us call this Scheme SS4.
Security Analysis
Now let us bound the entropy loss of sketch by Scheme SS4. The recoverable randomness involved is the coeffi cients of the polynomial F, as well as the generated Yj,i.
Thus the amount of randomness is (g -2t' -1) . logp + (qp -g) . log(p -1). By setting the parameter r = p, we can omit the H (j, Xi) and have a compact description of the sketch. Hence, the size of sketch is pq ·log p and the entropy loss can be bounded as follow:
H=(B) -H=(B I P )
pq logp -(g -2t' -1) logp -(qp -g) log(p -1)
When q is small, and p is large, the bound is similar to symmetric case. However, when q is large, i.e. when the auxiliary information has high entropy, and the amount of information leak can be high.
In the work by luels and Sudan [5] , the security strength is given by the number of spurious polynomials, i.e. poly nomials that have degree m -2t -1 and m roots in the sketches. For the symmetric scheme described above, with probability 1-fL, there exists at least �p( m -2 t -I ) -m (;;:,) m spurious polynomials.
Similarly, in the asymmetric scheme, with probability 1-11. there will be at least l!:.p( g -2 t' -1 ) -g ( _q _ T _ ) g -2 t' -1 ,.." 3 g -2 t' -1 polynomials with degree 9 -2t' -1 and 9 roots. Let us call these polynomials in asymmetric setting the spurious poly nomials. However, the analysis of the spurious polynomials is not sufficient for asymmetric setting as the likelihood of a spurious polynomial to be F depends on the distribution of the roots. Let us call a spurious polynomial a candidate polynomial if the number of distinct Di's that contains the roots of the polynomial is less than a threshold a. The probability that a random spurious polynomial is a candidate polynomial can be view as a variance of the birth day attack analysis. For example, the probability of the case when q = 2 (i.e. the consistent elements are twice impor tant as the inconsistent) is as follow: 9/2 _ 1 """' ( 2 9-X • ( r ) (g -x)) ( 2 ; ) x!-:.-a
For r = p = 104, t = 2, m = 22 there is 9.7629 x 1033 spurious polynomials with probability 1 -1/104 in sym metric setting; and with 9 = 35 and a = 32, (i.e. the sum of weights is 35, and polynomials with weight higher than 32 are candidate polynomials). There is in total 2.6996 x 1047 spurious polynomials with probability 1 -1/104. Note that the reason it has more spurious polynomials than syrmnet ric setting is because each element contributes two (chaf f) points. Therefore, approximately 2.4113 x 10 -5 of the spurious polynomials are candidate polynomials, which is 6.5095 x 1046.
Conclusion
We pointed out that, sketches that reveal auxiliary infor mation could leak important information leading to sketch distinguishability. To reduce the linkages among sketches, we proposed two schemes. The first scheme handles Eu clidean distance and it outputs sketches with intervals of unequaled size. The second scheme handles set-differences and caters the different consistency and importance of the set elements. Our schemes and analysis demonstrate that, by mixing the auxiliary information within the biometric data appropriately, we can reduce the linkage of sketches while acquiring the same bound in overall identity informa tion loss measured by entropy loss.
